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This collection brings together a number of papers of one of the towering
Christian philosophers of the century, Fr. Joseph Owens. Owens is most
recognized for his contemporary expositions of Thomistic metaphysics, and
for the profound perspective he brought to bear on the metaphysical thought
of Aristotle. But, in the burst of productivity that has marked the past twenty
years of Owens' career, much of his attention has turned to Aristotelian
ethics. We do not (yet) have a synthesis of Owens' thought on Aristotle's
ethics, comparable to The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics
(Toronto: 1951, rev. 1963 and 1973), but the gap is partially filled by the
present collection.
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All ofthe pa pers deal with ethical matters, though some do so less directly
t han others. Ma ny, but not all, bear on the ethical thought of Aristotle and
St. Thomas Aquinas. They are marked by Owens' clear and vivid style. As is
to be expected in such a collection , there is a good deal of repetition, as Owens
often approach es the same general issues from slightly different perspectives. I here discuss only four major points that Owens makes in these 500
rich pages.
1) Owens argues that it is indeed the case that an 'ought' cannot be derived
from an 'is' statement, and that Aristotle recognized this fact. That is why
Aristotle, and after him, St. Thomas Aquinas, insisted that the first principles of ethics have as their origin a human act of reason: choice. Owens argues
that this is why the goal of ethical a ction, the Aristotelian kalon, differs from
'values' posited by contemporary thinkers, which are th ought to exist in the
world independently of human will.
2) Owens exploits the above point to explain how Aristotelian ethics is
flexible enough to account for the fact that different people, in different
cultures, will make different ethical judgments. Ethical first principles are
due to choice, and these people choose differently on account of differing
habituation. Yet the common truth of human nature and the stability of a
common culture keep this flexibility within certain limits (52-4, 168-75).
3) Such flexibility accounts for the possibility of universality in moral
science, and is what enables Aristotle to appeal to 'right reason' (orthos logos )
as an ethical criterion. Owens worries about a theoretical circularity here:
right reason de pends on cultural h abituation, which depends on someone's
prior right reason, and so forth. Owens claims that a Christian, committed
to the temporal beginning ofthe world, would find this circularity intolerable,
and would avoid it by a ppeal to a s upernaturally revealed morality (228, 238).
4) Owens argues that the open-ended character of Aristotelian ethics is to
its credit. It is this which allowed it to be imported into the Christian
theological framework, as in the ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas. Owens argues
that this strengthens Aristotelian ethics in a number of res pects. Following
Maritain, Owens asserts that revelation has identified the true ultimate
object ofintellectual contemplation, of which Aristotle was unaware (136-7).
The revelation of divine rewards and punishments provides an effective
deterrent against evil, which, in Owens' view, is missing in the original
formulation of Aris totle's ethics (240-3). Only such theological grounding
leads to proper respect for human life (292).
The first of these points is central to Owens' understanding of Aristotelian
ethics. In my view, however, it is questionable. To support i.t . Owens repeatedly appeals to two passages. One is NEill 5, 1113b7-21, in which Aristotle
compares the r elation of agent to ethical action with the relation between a
parent and child. Owens interprets this as meaning that the ethical choice
one makes is bringing something totally new into the world, an 'image of
what is dominant in oneself (41, see also 235), but surely this is an over-interpretation. The relation of parent to child is Aris totle's s tandard example
of efficient causation (Phys II 3, 194b30-1), and Aristotle need not be saying
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more than that the efficient cause of a chosen action (not the ethical principle
t hat governs this action) is the one performing the action. The other is Metaph
E 1, 1025b18-27, in which Aristotle denies that first philosophy is a practical
science, o~ the grounds that the principle of things that are done lies in the
doer, i.e., in choice. Owens interprets this as meaning that practical science
differs from theoretical science insofar as the first principles of a practical
science such as ethics have their origin in human choice, not in the being of
things antecedent to choice (159-61). Again, the passage need not be read in
this way. The context shows that Aristotle is distinguishing the sciences of
physics and ethics not on the basis of the source of the principles of each
science, but on the basis of the efficient cause of the change that is studied
by each kind of thought. Physics studies things with efficient causes internal
to the changing substance at issue; practical science studies changes in the
world of which the efficieJ?.t cause is the choice of the human agent. That is
not to say that the first principles of that study a1·e themselves chosen.
Owens' view that Aristotle takes the first principles of ethics to be chosen
also runs into problems when considering the central role given in his ethics
to the biological notion of the 'good' of each substance, its intrinsic final cause.
Animals without reason nonetheless have a telos which is th eir true good,
although they do not choose it; the argument of NE I 7 identifies a life of
rational activity, that is, happiness, as just such a good in the case ofhuman
beings.
All of the essays are reprinted, with the exception of the Introduction,
written especially for this volume. This piece itself is a gem that admirers of
Owens' writing will not want to miss. In presenting an overview of the themes
of these essays, Owens sheds new light on the issues they raise, situating
their problems in the context of the larger issue of the possibility of a
Christian philosophy.
The volume is unfortunately marred by many typographical errors, many
of which obviously resulted from lax proofreading following the computer
scanning of the original articles.
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